The HED Task Catalog is under development. IDs are not stable until formal release. Comments are welcome at github.com/hed-standard/hed-task/issues.

False Belief Task

HED task ID: hedtsk_false_belief

Family: Social cognition and social choice tasks

Also known as: Sally-Anne Task, Theory of Mind Task, ToM Task

Wimmer & Perner–style narrative in which a protagonist holds a belief the participant knows to be false; correct prediction of the protagonist’s action indexes mentalizing.

Description

The False Belief Task assesses the ability to attribute mental states to others that differ from reality. In the classic Sally-Anne version, Sally places an object in location A and leaves; Anne moves the object to location B. Participants are asked where Sally will look for the object. Correct performance (location A) requires representing Sally’s false belief rather than the true state of the world. Adult neuroimaging versions use animated vignettes requiring belief reasoning. fMRI consistently activates medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and right temporoparietal junction.

Inclusion test

An experiment is an instance of this task when its procedure matches, it manipulates at least one of the listed variables, and it records at least one of the listed measures.

Procedure

Participants hear or read vignettes in which a character holds a belief that conflicts with reality (e.g., Sally-Anne scenario), then predict the character’s behavior.

Manipulation

True belief vs. false belief conditions; first-order vs. second-order belief attribution; verbal vs. nonverbal response; story complexity.

Measurement

Accuracy on false-belief vs. true-belief questions; RT; pass/fail classification in developmental studies.

Variations

Named versions that change what the participant experiences or does. The identifier of a variation is hedvar_<task>__<variation>.

Variation

Description

Justification

Sally-Anne / Change-of-Location

hedvar_false_belief__sally_anne_change_of_location

Classic location-change false belief.

Classic change-of-location false belief; canonical ToM paradigm

Unexpected Contents (Smarties/Crayon Box)

hedvar_false_belief__unexpected_contents_smarties_crayon_box

Deceptive container contents; test belief prediction.

Container with unexpected content; different scenario structure

Second-Order False Belief

hedvar_false_belief__second_order_false_belief

“She thinks that he thinks…” Multi-level recursion.

Belief about another’s belief; higher-order recursive ToM

Diverse Beliefs Task

hedvar_false_belief__diverse_beliefs

Multiple agents with different beliefs.

Two agents with different beliefs about same object; tests belief diversity understanding

Implicit False Belief (Looking Time)

hedvar_false_belief__implicit_false_belief_looking_time

Violation-of-expectation paradigms for preverbal infants.

Looking time measure of anticipation; no verbal response required

Anticipatory Looking

hedvar_false_belief__anticipatory_looking

Eye-tracking measures of predictive belief processing.

Eye-tracking where agent will look; different response modality

Animated Triangles (Heider-Simmel)

hedvar_false_belief__animated_triangles_heider_simmel

Social attribution from geometric motion.

Geometric shapes with attributed mental states; different stimulus and attribution task

Cartoon/Story Vignette Tasks

hedvar_false_belief__cartoon_story_vignette_tasks

Belief reasoning from narrative contexts.

Story-based false belief; different presentation format

Belief-Desire Reasoning

hedvar_false_belief__belief_desire_reasoning

Combining false beliefs with differing desires.

Combines belief and desire attribution; more complex ToM reasoning

Adult False Belief with Reaction Time

hedvar_false_belief__adult_false_belief_with_reaction_time

Adapted for adults using stories or videos with reaction-time dependent measures.

RT version for adults; measures implicit processing speed alongside accuracy

Competitive False Belief (Deception)

hedvar_false_belief__competitive_false_belief_deception

Participant must deceive another agent by exploiting their false belief; tests active use of ToM.

Strategic deception context; tests belief reasoning under competitive motivation

Cognitive processes

This task is designed to engage the following processes:

Key references

  • Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37-46. (DOI, PubMed)

  • Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind.” NeuroImage, 19(4), 1835-1842. (DOI, PubMed)

  • Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103–128. (DOI, PubMed)

Further references

  • Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014). Fractionating theory of mind: A meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 42, 9–34. (DOI, PubMed)

  • Apperly, I. A. (2012). What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65(5), 825–839. (DOI, PubMed)

  • Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–684. (DOI, PubMed)

  • Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308(5719), 255–258. [Updated: Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & Bian, L. (2016). Psychological reasoning in infancy. Annual Review of Psychology, 67, 159–186.] (DOI, PubMed)

  • Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116(4), 953–970. (DOI, PubMed)

  • Kulke, L., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). Implicit Theory of Mind: An overview of current replications and non-replications. Data in Brief, 16, 101–104. (DOI, PubMed)