Intentional Binding Task¶
HED Task ID: hedtsk_intentional_binding
Also known as: Temporal Binding Task, Action-Effect Binding Task, Libet Clock Binding Task, Interval Estimation Agency Task
Participants judge the perceived time of a voluntary action and/or its sensory effect using a Libet clock; the temporal compression between action and effect (intentional binding) indexes the implicit sense of agency.
Description¶
The Intentional Binding Task (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) measures the implicit sense of agency through perceived temporal shifts between voluntary actions and their sensory consequences. Participants watch a rotating clock hand (Libet clock) and make voluntary key presses that produce a tone after a fixed delay (typically 250 ms). In separate blocks, they report either the perceived time of their action (action binding: judged time shifts toward the tone) or the perceived time of the tone (effect binding: judged time shifts toward the action). The net temporal compression between action and effect — intentional binding — is taken as an implicit, pre-reflective marker of the sense of agency. Involuntary actions (e.g., TMS-induced movements) or externally triggered tones produce temporal repulsion rather than binding, establishing the specificity of the effect to voluntary agency. The paradigm has become the standard implicit measure of sense of agency, complementing explicit agency judgments. It is sensitive to disorders of agency including schizophrenia (reduced binding, especially in patients with passivity experiences), functional neurological disorder, and anarchic hand syndrome. Computational accounts link binding to motor prediction: the forward model predicts sensory consequences of voluntary actions, and the match between prediction and outcome generates the binding effect.
Inclusion test¶
Procedure |
Participants make voluntary actions (key presses) that produce delayed sensory effects (tones) while monitoring a Libet clock; they report the perceived time of either the action or the effect in separate blocks. |
Manipulation |
Action type (voluntary vs. involuntary/TMS-induced vs. passive observation); action-effect interval (150, 250, 450, 650 ms); effect probability (certain vs. uncertain); causal belief (participant told action causes vs. does not cause effect); outcome valence (positive vs. negative vs. neutral tone); social agency (self-caused vs. other-caused). |
Measurement |
Action binding (shift of perceived action time toward the effect); effect binding (shift of perceived effect time toward the action); overall intentional binding (action binding + effect binding); interval estimation (judged action-effect interval vs. actual); binding magnitude as individual-difference variable. |
Variations¶
Variation |
Description |
Justification |
|---|---|---|
Libet Clock Method (Standard) |
Haggard et al. (2002): report perceived position of a rotating clock hand at the moment of action or effect onset. The foundational paradigm. Separate action-binding and effect-binding blocks. |
Canonical: estimate action or tone time on rotating clock |
Interval Estimation Method |
Participants estimate the duration of the action-effect interval directly (e.g., in milliseconds or by reproducing the interval). Simpler than the Libet clock; avoids clock-reading demands. |
Estimate delay between action and outcome; different timing judgment task |
Involuntary Action Control (TMS) |
Transcranial magnetic stimulation over motor cortex produces involuntary finger movements. Involuntary actions produce temporal repulsion rather than binding, confirming agency specificity. |
TMS-induced involuntary movement instead of voluntary action; different action type |
Outcome Probability Manipulation |
Vary the probability that the action produces an effect (100%, 75%, 50%). Lower probability reduces binding, consistent with predictive (forward model) accounts. |
Vary probability that action produces tone; tests contingency on binding |
Causal Belief Manipulation |
Participants are told their action does or does not cause the tone (while physical contingency is held constant). Tests top-down causal belief contributions to binding. |
Instructions manipulate whether action causes outcome; tests belief on binding |
Social Intentional Binding |
One participant’s action causes an effect experienced by another (joint action), or participants observe another person’s action-effect pair. Tests vicarious and shared agency. |
Another person performs action; tests social extension of binding |
Outcome Valence Manipulation |
Action produces positive (reward tone), negative (aversive tone), or neutral effects. Tests whether emotional significance of outcomes modulates binding. Relevant to moral agency research. |
Aversive vs. pleasant outcomes; tests valence effect on temporal binding |
Cognitive processes¶
This task engages the following cognitive processes:
Key references¶
{‘authors’: ‘Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J.’, ‘year’: 2002, ‘title’: ‘Voluntary action and conscious awareness’, ‘venue’: ‘Nature Neuroscience’, ‘venue_type’: ‘journal’, ‘journal’: ‘Nature Neuroscience’, ‘volume’: ‘5’, ‘issue’: ‘4’, ‘pages’: ‘382-385’, ‘doi’: ‘10.1038/nn827’, ‘openalex_id’: None, ‘pmid’: None, ‘citation_string’: ‘Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385.’, ‘url’: ‘https://doi.org/10.1038/nn827’, ‘source’: ‘crossref’, ‘confidence’: ‘high’, ‘verified_on’: ‘2026-04-20’}
{‘authors’: ‘Moore, J. W., & Obhi, S. S.’, ‘year’: 2012, ‘title’: ‘Intentional binding and the sense of agency: A review’, ‘venue’: ‘Consciousness and Cognition’, ‘venue_type’: ‘journal’, ‘journal’: ‘Consciousness and Cognition’, ‘volume’: ‘21’, ‘issue’: ‘1’, ‘pages’: ‘546-561’, ‘doi’: ‘10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002’, ‘openalex_id’: None, ‘pmid’: None, ‘citation_string’: ‘Moore, J. W., & Obhi, S. S. (2012). Intentional binding and the sense of agency: A review. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 546-561.’, ‘url’: ‘https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002’, ‘source’: ‘crossref’, ‘confidence’: ‘high’, ‘verified_on’: ‘2026-04-20’}
{‘authors’: ‘Wolpe, N., Haggard, P., Siebner, H. R., & Rowe, J. B.’, ‘year’: 2013, ‘title’: ‘Cue integration and the perception of action in intentional binding’, ‘venue’: ‘Experimental Brain Research’, ‘venue_type’: ‘journal’, ‘journal’: ‘Experimental Brain Research’, ‘volume’: ‘229’, ‘issue’: ‘3’, ‘pages’: ‘467-474’, ‘doi’: ‘10.1007/s00221-013-3419-2’, ‘openalex_id’: None, ‘pmid’: None, ‘citation_string’: ‘Wolpe, N., Haggard, P., Siebner, H. R., & Rowe, J. B. (2013). Cue integration and the perception of action in intentional binding. Experimental Brain Research, 229(3), 467-474.’, ‘url’: ‘https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-013-3419-2’, ‘source’: ‘crossref’, ‘confidence’: ‘high’, ‘verified_on’: ‘2026-04-20’}
Recent references¶
{‘authors’: ‘Voss, M., Moore, J., Hauser, M., Gallinat, J., Heinz, A., & Haggard, P.’, ‘year’: 2010, ‘title’: ‘Altered awareness of action in schizophrenia: a specific deficit in predicting action consequences’, ‘venue’: ‘Brain’, ‘venue_type’: ‘journal’, ‘journal’: ‘Brain’, ‘volume’: ‘133’, ‘issue’: ‘10’, ‘pages’: ‘3104-3112’, ‘doi’: ‘10.1093/brain/awq152’, ‘openalex_id’: None, ‘pmid’: None, ‘citation_string’: ‘Voss, M., Moore, J., Hauser, M., Gallinat, J., Heinz, A., & Haggard, P. (2010). Altered awareness of action in schizophrenia: A specific deficit in predicting action consequences. Brain, 133(10), 3104-3112.’, ‘url’: ‘https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awq152’, ‘source’: ‘crossref’, ‘confidence’: ‘high’, ‘verified_on’: ‘2026-04-20’}
{‘authors’: ‘Borhani, K., Beck, B., & Haggard, P.’, ‘year’: 2017, ‘title’: ‘Choosing, Doing, and Controlling: Implicit Sense of Agency Over Somatosensory Events’, ‘venue’: ‘Psychological Science’, ‘venue_type’: ‘journal’, ‘journal’: ‘Psychological Science’, ‘volume’: ‘28’, ‘issue’: ‘7’, ‘pages’: ‘882-893’, ‘doi’: ‘10.1177/0956797617697693’, ‘openalex_id’: None, ‘pmid’: None, ‘citation_string’: ‘Borhani, K., Beck, B., & Haggard, P. (2017). Choosing, doing, and controlling: Implicit sense of agency over somatosensory events. Psychological Science, 28(7), 882-893.’, ‘url’: ‘https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617697693’, ‘source’: ‘crossref’, ‘confidence’: ‘high’, ‘verified_on’: ‘2026-04-20’}
{‘authors’: ‘Suzuki, K., Lush, P., Seth, A. K., & Roseboom, W.’, ‘year’: 2019, ‘title’: ‘Intentional Binding Without Intentional Action’, ‘venue’: ‘Psychological Science’, ‘venue_type’: ‘journal’, ‘journal’: ‘Psychological Science’, ‘volume’: ‘30’, ‘issue’: ‘6’, ‘pages’: ‘842-853’, ‘doi’: ‘10.1177/0956797619842191’, ‘openalex_id’: None, ‘pmid’: None, ‘citation_string’: ‘Suzuki, K., Lush, P., Seth, A. K., & Roseboom, W. (2019). Intentional binding without intentional action. Psychological Science, 30(6), 842-853.’, ‘url’: ‘https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619842191’, ‘source’: ‘crossref’, ‘confidence’: ‘high’, ‘verified_on’: ‘2026-04-20’}